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Abstract
Interpretable predictions, where it is clear why a machine learning model has made
a particular decision, can compromise privacy by revealing the characteristics of
individual data points. This raises the central question addressed in this paper: Can
models be interpretable without compromising privacy? For complex “big” data fit
by correspondingly rich models, balancing privacy and explainability is particularly
challenging, such that this question has remained largely unexplored. In this paper,
we propose a family of simple models in the aim of approximating complex models
using several locally linear maps per class to provide high classification accuracy,
as well as differentially private explanations on the classification. We illustrate
the usefulness of our approach on several image benchmark datasets as well as a
medical dataset.
1 Introduction
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) by the European Union imposes two important
requirements on algorithmic design, interpretability and privacy [27]. These requirements introduce
new standards on future algorithmic techniques, making them of particular concern to the machine
learning community [9]. This paper addresses these two requirements in the context of classification,
and studies the trade-off between privacy, accuracy and interpretability, see Fig. 1.
Broadly speaking, there are two options to take for gaining interpretability: (i) rely on inherently
interpretable models; and (ii) rely on post-processing schemes to probe trained complex models.
Inherently interpretable models are often relatively simple and their predictions can be easily analyzed
in terms of their respective input features. For instance, in logistic regression classifiers and sparse
linear models the coefficients represent the importance of each input feature. However, modern “big”
data typically exhibit complex patterns, such that these relatively simplistic models often have lower
accuracy than more complex ones. To address this trade-off between interpretability and accuracy
(Fig. 1 B ) there are many attempts to use more complex models such as deep neural networks and
post-process these models to gain insights [2, 3, 16, 21, 22, 24, 26].
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Figure 1: Modern machine learning systems need
to trade off accuracy, privacy, and interpretability.
On the other hand, many recent papers address
the concern that complex models with outstand-
ing predictive performance can expose sensitive
information from the dataset they were trained
on [5, 7, 23, 25]. To quantify privacy, many re-
cent approaches adopt the notion of differential
privacy (DP), which provides a mathematically
provable definition of privacy, and can quantify
the level of privacy an algorithm or a model pro-
vides [6]. In plain English, an algorithm is called
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differentially private, if its output is random enough to obscure the participation of any single indi-
vidual in the data. The randomness is typically achieved by injecting noise into the algorithm. The
amount of noise is determined by the level of privacy the algorithm guarantees and the sensitivity, a
maximum difference in its output depending on a single individual’s participation or non-participation
in the data (See Sec. 2 for a mathematical definition of DP).
There is, however, a natural trade-off between privacy and accuracy (Fig. 1 C ): while a large amount
of added noise provides a high level of privacy but also harms prediction accuracy. When the number
of parameters is high, like in deep neural network models, juggling this trade-off is very challenging,
as privatizing high dimensional parameters results in a high privacy loss to meet a good prediction
level [1]. Therefore, most existing work considers small networks or assumes that some relevant data
are publicly available to train a significant part of the network without privacy violation (See Sec. 5
for details).
In this paper, we study the trade-off between interpretability, privacy, and accuracy. Taking into
account privacy and interpretability (Fig. 1 A ), we propose a family of inherently interpretable
models that do not require post-processing for interpretability and can be trained privately. These
models approximate the mapping of a complex model from the input data to class score functions,
using locally linear maps (LLM) per class. Our formulation for LLM is inspired by the fact that a
differentiable function can be well approximated as a collection of piece-wise linear functions, i.e., the
first-order Taylor expansion of the function at a sufficiently large number of input locations. Indeed,
our local models with a sufficiently large number of linear maps permit a relatively slight loss in
accuracy compared to complex model counterparts1. In addition, the learned linear maps for each
class provide insights on the key features for a classification task at hand.
Our locally linear maps, however, often introduce many linear maps (i.e., many parameters) to reach
the classification performance of complex model counterparts. In terms of privacy, the high dimen-
sionality introduces a challenge as mentioned earlier. We adopt the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform,
a.k.a., random projection [10], to decrease the dimensionality of each locally linear maps to an inter-
mediate level and privatize the resulting lower dimensional quantities. We study the interplay between
interpretability, privacy, and random projection in Sec. 4. To the best our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to study the trade-off between privacy, accuracy, and interpretability. We hope that this work
sparks a conversation in the machine learning community for algorithmic designs which consider all
three simultaneously.
2 Background on Differential Privacy
We start by providing background information on differential privacy and a composition method that
we will use in our algorithm, as well as random projections.
Differential privacy. Consider an algorithmM and neighbouring datasets D and D′ differing by
a single entry, where the dataset D′ is obtained by excluding one datapoint from the dataset D. In
differential privacy [6], the quantity of interest is privacy loss , defined by
L(o) = log
Pr(M(D) = o)
Pr(M(D′) = o) , (1)
where M(D) and M(D′) denote the outputs of the algorithm given D and D′, respectively.
Pr(M(D) = o) denotes the probability that M returns a specific output o. When the two proba-
bilities in Eq. (1) are very similar, even a strong adversary, who knows all the datapoints in D except
for one, could not discern the one datapoint by which D and D′ differ, based on the output of the
algorithm alone. On the other hand, when the probabilities are very different, it would be easy to
identify the exclusion of the single datapoint in D′. Hence, the privacy loss quantifies how revealing
an algorithm’s output is about the single entry’s participation to the dataset D. Formally, an algorithm
M is called -DP if and only if |L(o)| ≤ ,∀o. A weaker version of the above is (, δ)-DP, if and only
if |L(o)| ≤ , with probability at least 1− δ.
A popular way of designing differentially private algorithms is by introducing a noise addition step to
the algorithm. The output perturbation method achieves a DP output by adding noise to the output
1The level of loss in prediction accuracy depends on the complexity of data.
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h, where the noise is calibrated to h’s sensitivity, denoted by Sh. A common form of sensitivity is
the L2-sensitivity, which is the maximum difference in terms of L2-norm, under the one datapoint’s
difference in D and D′, Sh = maxD,D′,D\D′=1 ‖h(D) − h(D)‖2. With the sensitivity, we can
privatize the output using the Gaussian mechanism, which simply adds Gaussian noise of the form:
h˜(D) = h(D) +N (0, S2hσ2Ip), where N (0, S2hσ2Ip) means the Gaussian distribution with mean 0
and covariance S2hσ
2Ip. The resulting quantity h˜(D) is (, δ)-DP, where σ ≥
√
2 log(1.25/δ)/ (see
[6, Appendix] for a proof). In this paper, we use the Gaussian mechanism to achieve differentially
private locally linear maps.
Properties of differential privacy. There are two important properties of differential privacy. The
first one is post-processing invariance, which states that applying any data-independent mechanism
to a differentially private quantity does not alter the privacy level of the resulting quantity. Formally,
Proposition 1 (Proposition 2.1 [6]). Let a mechanism that maps data where χ is the data universe to
an output space, i.e.,M : N|χ| 7→ R be a randomized algorithm that is (, δ)-differentially private.
Let f : R 7→ R′ be an arbitrary, data-independent, randomized mapping. Then f ◦M : N|χ| 7→ R′
is also (, δ)- differentially private.
The second one is composability, which states that combining differentially private quantities degrades
privacy. For instance, if one computes a statistic given a dataset and adds Gaussian noise, and repeats
this routine multiple times, combining these privatized quantities, e.g., the average of these quantities
will be quite close to the true statistic. Hence, one needs to increase the noise level to keep the strength
of the privacy guarantee after the repeated use of data. Existing composition theorems show, how
exactly the privacy parameters  and δ compose, when differentially private subroutines are combined.
The most naïve way to compose these parameters is the linear composition (Theorem 3.14 in [6]),
where the resulting parameter, which is often called cumulative privacy loss (cumulative  and δ), are
linearly summed up,  =
∑T
t=1 t and δ =
∑T
t=1 δt after the repeated use of data T times.
Recently, [1] proposed the moments accountant method, which provides a clever way of combining 
and δ such that the resulting total privacy loss is significantly smaller than that by other composition
methods. The moments accountant method takes advantage of the fact that when adding Gaussian
noise in each training step, the privacy loss in Eq. (1) also follows a Gaussian distribution. Hence, by
observing the tail behaviour of the Gaussian random variable, one can obtain a tight moments bound
which provides a better utility (i.e., smaller noise yields the same privacy guarantee compared to other
composition methods) in the resulting (, δ) guarantee. See Appendix Sec. A for details.
Random projections in the context of differential privacy Our method involves projecting each
input onto a lower-dimensional space using a Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform (a.k.a., random
projection) [10]. We construct the projection matrix R by drawing each entry from N (0, 1/D′)
where D′ is the dimension of the projected space. This projection nearly preserves the distances
between two points in the data space and in the embedding space, as this projection guarantees
low-distortion embeddings. Random projections have previously been used to ensure differential
privacy [4]. However, here we only utilize them as a convenient method to reduce input dimension
to our learnable linear maps. Since the random filters are data-independent, they do not need to be
privatized. Now as we covered all relevant background information, in the next section we introduce
our method.
3 Locally Linear Maps (LLM)
Suppose we trained a neural network model on a K-class classification problem, where the network
maps a high dimensional input x ∈ RD to a class score function s(x), i.e., the pre-activation before
the final softmax, where s(x) is aK-dimensional vector with entries sk. Denote the mapping φ : x 7→
s(x) and the parameters of the network by θ. Can we find the best approximation to the function φ,
which presents interpretable features for classification and also guarantees a certain level of privacy?
To answer this question, we propose an approximation by locally linear maps (LLM), inspired by
gradient-based attribution methods for deep neural networks [2].
The gradient-based attribution methods assume that there is a set of attributions, at which the gradients
of a classifier with respect to the input are maximized, and that the gradient information provides
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interpretability as to why the classifier makes a certain prediction. More specifically, they consider a
first order Taylor approximation of φ
φ(x) ≈ φ(x0) + φ′(x0)>(x− x0) = φ′(x0)>x+ shift term, (2)
where φ′(x0) =
[
∂
∂xφ(x)
]
x=x0
, and the shift term is φ(x0)− φ′(x0)>x0. Notice that, (a) the first
order approximation is only accurate locally at x0; (b) a good location x0 maximizes the gradient,
because that point is intuitively where a tiny change in the input space would make the large change
in the classification. Therefore, finding a good location x0 and its gradient would reveal the most
discriminative features for a given classification.
However, directly using φ and its gradients violates privacy, as φ contains sensitive information about
individuals from the training dataset. In practise, privatizing φ often proves to be difficult because
of its unknown sensitivity, in other words, we do not know how much noise to add to privatize φ.
Thus, we cannot use φ and its gradients, unless we privatize the parameters of φ or we train φ using
public data. The first – if at all possible – typically incurs a high privacy loss to meet a certain level
of classification accuracy as θ is typically high-dimensional; and the latter is often infeasible as
public data is often simply not available. Here, we present a different approach than post-processing
a trained neural network to simultaneously obtain high classification accuracy and interpretability
while preserving privacy.
3.1 Locally Linear Maps
We introduce a set of local functions fk to approximate the score function at each class sk, and
parameterize each fk by a combination of M linear maps denoted by gkm, as if we directly learned
the gradient directions of φ at M input points per class:
fk(x) =
M∑
m=1
σkm g
k
m(x), (3)
where gkm(x) = w
k
m
>x+ bkm, and σ
k
m(x) =
exp
[
β · gkm(x)
]∑M
m=1 exp [β · gkm(x)]
. (4)
TheM linear maps are weighted separately for each class using the weighting coefficients σkm, which
determine how important each linear map is for classifying a given input. One way to choose the
weighting coefficients is by assigning a probability to each linear map using the softmax function as in
Eq. (4). We introduce a global inverse temperature parameter β in the softmax to tune the sensitivity of
the relative weighting – large β (small temperature) favours single filters; small β (high temperature)
favours several filters. The softmax weighting is a heuristic we chose to avoid the non-identifiability
issues of parameters in mixture models.
Although we motivated our method from the point of view of a first-order Taylor approximation, we
cannot identify the gradients of φ at various input points from the learned linear maps wkm, as there
can be many input points that produce the same gradients2. Hence, we only show the difference and
similarity in the features learned from the neural-net-based classifier and the locally linear maps in
Sec. 4, where we visualize the qualitative differences and similarities tested on several datasets.
We train the LLM by optimizing the following (standard) cross-entropy loss:
L(W,D) = −
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
yn,k log yˆn,k(W), (5)
where we denote the parameters of LLM collectively by W, and we define the predictive class
label by the mapping from the pre-activation through another softmax function, yˆn,k(W) =
exp(fk(xn))/[
∑K
k′=1 exp(fk′(xn))].
3.2 Differentially private LLM
To produce differentially private locally linear map parameters W˜, we adopt the moments accountant
method combined with the gradient-perturbation technique. This involves (a) perturbing gradients at
2However, we can identify the linear maps from the gradients of φ, though this violates privacy.
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each learning step when optimizing Eq. (5) for all locally linear map parameters W; and (b) using
the moments accountant method to compute the cumulative privacy loss after the training is over.
When we perturb the gradient, we need to ensure to add the right amount of noise. As there is no way
of knowing how much change a single datapoint would make in the gradient’s L2-norm, we rescale
all the datapoint-wise gradients, ht(xn) := ∇WL(W,Dn) for all n = {1, · · · , N}, by a pre-defined
norm clipping threshold, C, as used in [1], i.e.,
h¯t(xn)← ht(xn)/max(0, ‖ht(xi)‖2/C). (6)
Algorithm 1 summarizes this procedure, Now we formally state that the resulting locally linear maps
are differentially private in Theorem 3.1.
Algorithm 1 DP-LLM for interpretable classification
Require: Dataset D, norm-clipping threshold C, privacy parameter σ2, and learning rate ηt
Ensure: (, δ)-DP locally linear maps for all K classes, W˜
for number of training steps t ≤ T do
1: For each minibatch of size L, we noise up the gradient after clipping the norm of the datapoint-
wise gradient given in Eq. (6) via h˜t ← 1L
[∑L
n=1 h¯t(xn) +N (0, σ2C2I)
]
.
2: Then, we make a step in the descending direction by W˜t+1 ← W˜t − ηth˜t.
end for
Calculate the cumulative privacy loss (, δ) using the moments accountant.
Theorem 3.1. Algorithm 1 produces (, δ)-DP locally linear maps for all K classes.
The proof is provided in Appendix Sec. B.
For high-dimensional inputs such as images, we found that adding noise to the gradient corresponding
to the full dimension of W lead to very low accuracies for private training. Therefore, we propose
to incorporate the random projection matrix Rm ∈ RD′×D with D′  D, which is shared among
classes k, to first decrease the dimensionality of the parameters that need to be privatized. We now
have the following parameterization for each locally linear maps, wkm = m
k
mRm, where the effective
parameter for each local linear map is mkm ∈ RD
′
. We perturb the gradient of mkm for all k and m in
each training step in Algorithm 1 to produce differentially private linear maps, w˜km = m˜
k
mRm.
Due to Prop. 1, we can use the differentially private locally linear maps to make predictions on test
data. Here we focus on guarding the training data’s privacy and assume that the test data do not need
to be privatized, which is a common assumption in DP literature.
4 Experiments
In this section we evaluate the trade-off between accuracy, privacy, and interpretability for our LLM
model on several datasets and compare to other methods where appropriate. Our implementation is
available on GitHub3.
4.1 MNIST Classification
We consider the classification of MNIST [11] and Fashion-MNIST [28] images with the usual train/test
splits and train a CNN4 as a baseline model, which has two convolutional layers with 5x5 filters and
first 20, then 50 channels each followed by max-pooling and finally a fully connected layer with 500
units. The model achieves 99% test accuracy on MNIST and 87% on Fashion-MNIST.
We train several LLMs in the private and non-private setting. By default, we use LLM models with
M = 30 predictions per class and random projections to D′ = 300 dimensions, which are optimized
for 20 epochs using the Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.001, decreasing by 20% every 5 epochs.
3https://github.com/frhrdr/dp-llm
4https://github.com/pytorch/examples/blob/master/mnist/main.py
5
On MNIST the model benefits from an increased inverse softmax temperature β = 1/30, while
β = 1 is optimal for Fashion-MNIST. We choose a large batch size of 500, as this improves the
signal-to-noise ratio of our algorithm. In the private setting we clip the per-sample gradient norm to
C = 0.001 and train with σ = 1.3, which gives this model an ( = 2, δ = 10−5)-DP guarantee via
the moments accountant. For the low privacy regime  ≥ 4 we train with a batch size of 1500 and for
60 epochs.
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Figure 2: Accuracy of our LLM model on the MNIST testset for different levels of privacy and
different model configurations in the private ( ) and non-private ( ) setting. Errorbars are 2
stdev from 10 random restarts; dashed lines on the right ( ) denote no random projections.
First, we consider the trade-off between privacy and accuracy (Fig. 1 C ) in Fig. 2 (left). Note that
current privatized network methods [1, 19] achieve an accuracy of 95% for  = 2 and up to 92% for
 = 0.5, which is comparable to our mean accuracy of 94.2± 0.4% and 91.8± 0.4% respectively (on
Fashion-MNIST we achieve 80.7±0.6% and 83.2±0.4%). However, such a privatized network does
not provide transparent explanations as opposed to our approach. In the remainder of Fig. 2 we study
the impact of varying the number of filters per class M (center) and the output dimensionality of
the random projections D′ (right) in private and non-private LLM models. Private LLMs deteriorate
beyond a certain number of linear maps due to the increased noise needed to privatize them, whereas
non-private models continue to benefit from additional filters. Increasing the dimensionality of the
random projections benefits private training.
Next, we show the trade-offs with interpretability (Fig. 1 A and B ). For this, we investigate the
learned LLM filters under increasing privacy guarantees and increased private utility as shown in
Fig. 3. In the unconstrained setting, filter selection assigns high weights to single filters, which is
why in the low privacy settings top and bottom row are hardly different. In the high privacy setting
this evens out and we see that while the individual filters become hard to distinguish as intermediate
dimension D′ and privacy loss  are decreased, the weighted average of filters used for classification
still provide a good local explanation of what parts of the given input the model is sensitive to.
Additional private filter visualizations for Fashion-MNIST are shown in Fig. 10 in the appendix.
Input
not private large  med  small 
top filters (out of 30)
weighted filters (over 30)
not private large  med  small 
top filters (out of 30)
weighted filters (over 30)
no projections, vary  non-private, vary D′ D′ = 300 projections, vary 
Figure 3: Decay of filter interpretability in an LLM in three different settings. left: increasing privacy
guarantee, center: reducing the dimensionality D′ of random projections, right: increasing privacy at
fixed 300 random projections. Top row: highest activated filters in target class, Bottom row: sum of
filters in target class weighted by contribution
In order to highlight the advantage of the simplistic LLM architecture in terms of immediate inter-
pretability, we compare the learned filters our model uses to classify certain images to two attribution
methods for a neural network trained on the same data. We train a simple CNN and an LLM on
Fashion-MNIST to matching 87% test accuracy. We then use SmoothGrad [24] and integrated gradi-
ents [26] to visualize the CNN’s sensitivity to test images and compare these methods to LLM filters
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in Fig. 4 (and Fig. 8). Note that we did not multiply the integrated gradient with the input image,
as Fashion-MNIST images have a mask-like effect which occludes the partial output of the method.
We observe that both alternative attribution methods produce similar outputs, which are nonetheless
hard to interpret, whereas the LLM filters show simplistic prototype images of the classes they are
associated with. This is further illustrated in Fig. 5 where we show the three highest weighted filters
for test images from three classes. The diversity of filters varies a lot for different class labels, as
some are more varied and harder to discriminate than others. For instance, while the sandal class
(center) has filters which distinguish between different types of heels, the ankle boot filters (right)
show similar coarse features, which are sufficient for classifying a majority of the inputs correctly.
The coat (left) filters are mostly selective in the shoulder region and general silhouette, but some
filters also track other features like arms, collar and zipper.
Input IG SG LLM top LLM avg Input IG SG LLM top LLM avg
Figure 4: Comparison of interpretability CNN and LLM. left to right: input image, integrated gradient
(IG) of CNN, smoothed gradient (SG) of CNN, top filter of LLM, weighted target class filters of LLM
Input 98.43% 0.52% 0.34%
Input 93.86% 1.44% 0.57%
Input 58.78% 5.76% 2.06%
Input 78.40% 6.25% 1.79%
Input 58.47% 29.34% 10.51%
Input 91.32% 6.48% 1.64%
Input 96.84% 0.89% 0.34%
Input 99.71% 0.09% 0.02%
Input 99.64% 0.04% 0.03%
Figure 5: Top 3 filters with associated weightings for test images from three classes.
4.2 Disease classification in a medical dataset
As a second task we consider disease classification in the Henan Renmin Hospital Data [12, 14]5.
It contains 110,300 medical records with 62 input features and 3 binary outputs. The input features
are 4 basic examinations (sex, BMI, distolic, systolic), 26 items from blood examinations, 12 items
from urine examinations, and 20 items from liver function tests. The three binary outputs denote three
medical conditions – hypertension, diabetes, and fatty liver – which can also co-occur. Following [14]
we transform this multi-label task into a multi-class problem by considering the powerset of the three
binary choices as eight independent classes. Because these classes are highly imbalanced, we only
retained the four most common classes, leaving us with 100,140 records.
By default, we use an LLM model with M = 2 predictions per class and no random projections,
which is optimized for 20 epochs using the Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.01, decreasing by
20% every 5 epochs. We choose a batch size of 256. In the private setting we clip the per-sample
gradient norm to 0.001 and train with σ = 1.25, which gives this model an ( ≈ 1.5, δ = 2·10−5)-DP
guarantee via the moments accountant.
We train a baseline DNN (3 fully connected hidden layers with 128 units each) as well as several
LLMs with varying number of linear filters per class in private and non-private settings. In Fig. 6 we
5The dataset is provided by [14] and was available at http://pinfish.cs.usm.edu/dnn/
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Figure 6: Accuracy of our LLM model on the Henan Renmin Hospital testset for different levels of
privacy and different model configurations in the private and non-private setting. Errorbars are 2 stdev
for 10 random restarts.
visualize the trade-off between accuracy and privacy for varying privacy losses as well as numbers of
linear maps. Like before, the accuracy deteriorates as we decrease the privacy loss (Fig. 6 left). As
the number of linear maps per class is increased (Fig. 6 right), the accuracy for the private models
also drops due to the privacy budget being spread across more parameters. We attribute the drop in
performance for the non-private LLM with number of maps to optimization difficulties and local
minima as well as higher sensitivity to hyperparameters. A small number of maps (between 2 and 5) is
sufficient for this datasets, especially in the private setting. Our LLMs attain 82.8±0.5% (non-private),
82.0± 0.4% ( ≈ 1.5), and 79.8± 0.4% ( ≈ 0.2) compared to 84± 0.5% for a non-private DNN.
IG DNN
LLM
LLM (ε ≈ 1.5)
LLM (ε < 0.1)
IG DNN
LLM
LLM (ε ≈ 1.5)
LLM (ε < 0.1)
IG DNN
LLM
LLM (ε ≈ 1.5)
LLM (ε < 0.1)
IG DNN
LLM
LLM (ε ≈ 1.5)
LLM (ε < 0.1)
Example from class 1 Example from class 2
Example from class 3 Example from class 4
Figure 7: Integrated gradient (IG) and weighted linear filters (LLM; our method) for all 62 feature for
one example from each class from the Henan Renmin dataset. For LMM we consider the non-private
case (LLM) as well as two private cases with strong ( < 0.1) and weaker ( ≈ 1.5) privacy. Entries
are normalized and colorcoded between = −1, = 0, and = 1.
In Fig. 7 we consider an example from each class and show the weighted linear maps by the LLM for
each example as well as its integrated gradients (IGs) [26]. For our LLM we consider the non-private
and two private cases. In general, there is good agreement between all attribution methods; they are
relatively sparse and focus on a small set of features. We found that IGs varied much more between
examples from the same class than our LLMs (see Fig. 9 in Appendix C.2). For strong privacy
( < 0.1), the linear maps are much less sparse, highlighting the trade-off between interpretability
and privacy.
5 Related Work
Interpretability. The saliency map and gradient-based attribution methods are one of the most
popular explanation methods that identify relevant regions and assign importance to each input
feature (e.g., pixel for image data) [2, 3, 16, 21, 22, 24, 26]. These methods typically use first-order
gradient information of a complex model with respect to inputs, to produce maps that indicate the
relative importance of the different input features for the classification. An obvious downside of
these approaches is that they provide explanations conditioned on only a single input and hence
it is necessary to manually assess each input of interest in order to draw a class-wide conclusion.
In contrast, our approach can draw class-wide conclusions without manually assessing each input,
because it outputs the most relevant explanations in terms of a collection of linear maps for each
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class. For explanations conditioned on any specific input, our model can provide an input-dependent
weighted collection of these features related to that specific input.
Privacy. To privatize complex models, such as deep neural networks, a popular approach is to add
noise to the gradients in the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm [1, 15, 18]. An alternative
approach is to directly perturb the objective with additive noise [19, 20, 29]. In these works, the
objective function is approximated by the Taylor expansion, and the resulting coefficients of the poly-
nomials are perturbed before training. We found the latter approach less practical than the former, as
we need to choose which order of polynomial degree to use. Typically, adding more layers introduces
a more nested-ness in the objective function in which case using a higher order approximation is
more suitable to approximate the loss function accurately. A high degree of polynomial approxima-
tion, however, increases the privacy loss as the dimensionality of the coefficients grow. From our
perspective, the gradient perturbation method is simple to use and model agnostic, and there are
many successful examples of the gradient perturbation methods used in slightly different settings than
privatizing a whole model from scratch, such as knowledge transfer from teacher models to student
models in [1, 17, 18]. However, none of these methods took interpretability into account, and some of
the work assume the availability of public data to train a significant part of their model to decrease the
necessary privacy budget to train the entire model. In our method, no access to public data is assumed
and interpretability through linear maps is a key component of the trained model.
Mixtures of Experts. Our LLMs are reminiscent of Mixture of experts (ME) models. A ME assigns
different specialized linear models to different parts of input space in a discriminative task (see [13]
for a broad overview of existing ME models). In our case, each local expert model is class specific
and contributes to a weighted linear map for that class. The weighting provides an input-dependent
significance for each linear map, and considering more than one map per class brings in the flexibility
to fit the data better. Another relevant model is the Mixture of factor analyzer (MFA), which also has
a very similar flavour as the ME models, but developed for density estimation of high-dimensional
real-valued data [8].
6 Conclusion and Discussion
We proposed a family of simple models that aim to approximate neural-net-based models using several
locally linear maps (LLM) per class to provide interpretable features in a privacy-preserving manner
while maintaining high classification accuracy. Results on two image benchmark datasets as well as
a medical dataset indicate that a reasonable trade-off between classification accuracy, privacy and
interpretability can indeed be struck and tuned by varying the number of linear maps. Nevertheless,
several open questions for future research remain. First, the datasets in this paper are still relatively
simple, such that it would be intriguing to see the limits of complexity the LLM model can model
with a sufficiently high accuracy. Second, the current model does not interact with a larger and richer
counterpart, such as a neural network, due to privacy constraints. It would be interesting to investigate
if gaining gradient information of a more flexible model at particularly important input points in a
differentially private way would be possible, in order to combine benefits of both models.
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Supplementary Material for Locally Linear Maps
A A short summary for moments accountant method
The moments accountant. The privacy loss in eq. 1 is a random variable once we add noise to the
output of the algorithm. In fact, when we add Gaussian noise, the privacy loss random variable is also
Gaussian distributed. Using the tail bound of Gaussian privacy loss random variable, the moments
accountant method [1] provides a clever way of combining  and δ such that the resulting total privacy
loss is significantly smaller than other composition methods.
In the moments accountant method, the cumulative privacy loss is calculated by bounding the moments
of the privacy loss random variable L(o). First off, each λ-th moment, where λ can be positive
integers, is defined as the log of the moment generating function evaluated at λ, i.e., αM(λ;D,D′) =
logEo∼M(D)
[
eλL
(o)
]
. Then, by taking the maximum over the neighbouring datasets, we compute
the worst case λ-th moment by, αM(λ) = maxD,D′ αM(λ;D,D′), where the form of αM(λ) is
determined by the moment of a Gaussian random variable. The moments accountant then computes
αM(λ) at each step. The composability theorem (Theorem 2.1 in [1]) states that the λ-th moment
composes linearly if we add independent noise at each training step. So, we can simply sum up the
upper bound on each αMt to obtain an upper bound on the total λ-th moment after T compositions,
αM(λ) ≤
∑T
t=1 αMt(λ). Finally, once the moment bound is computed, we can convert the λ-th
moment to the (, δ)-DP guarantee by, δ = minλ exp [αM(λ)− λ], for any  > 0. See Appendix A
in [1] for the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We first prove that one gradient step in Algorithm 1 produces differentially private locally
linear maps, then generalize this result for the T number of gradient steps.
Given an initial data-independent value ofW0, if we add Gaussian noise to the norm-clipped gradient
evaluated on the subsampled data with the samping rate q = L/N , then due to the Gaussian mecha-
nism (Theorem 3.22 in [2]) and Theorem 1 in [1], the resulting estimate W˜1 from a single gradient
step (i.e., the step 2 in Algorithm 1) is (′, δ′)-differentially private, where σ ≥ c · q√log(1/δ′)/′
with some constant c. Now, as W˜1 is already privatized, we can make further gradient steps from
W˜1, which makes W˜2 also (′, δ′)-differentially private, as the only part that depends on the data
is the gradient which we perturb for privacy. Applying the same amount of Gaussian noise to the
gradient in each step ensures each W˜t for all t also (′, δ′)-differentially private.
Finally, the composibility and tail bound in Theorem 2 in [1] proves that the cumulative privacy loss
after T training steps computed by the moments accountant method ensures (, δ)6-DP locally linear
maps.
6Note that we can identify the exact relationship between the cumulative loss (, δ) and (′, δ′) numerically
only, due to the constant factor in σ ≥ c · q√log(1/δ′)/′. We use code published by [1] to compute these
numerically.
C Additional Experimental Results
C.1 Comparison of attribution methods on MNIST
Input IG SG LLM top LLM avg
Figure 8: Comparison between different attribution methods, similar to Fig. 4 but for MNIST. On
this dataset, the network attributions resemble more closely than on Fashion-MNIST, highlighting
relevant edges. LLM filters exhibit the same kind of coarse prototypical images with pronounced
edges as on Fashion-MNIST.
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C.2 Attribution methods on medical data
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Figure 9: Integrated gradient (IG) and weighted linear filters (LLM; our method) for all 62 feature for
four example from each class from the Henan Renmin dataset. For LMM we consider the non-private
case (LLM) as well as two private cases with strong ( < 0.1) and weaker ( ≈ 1.5) privacy. Entries
are normalized and colorcoded between = −1, = 0, and = 1. This is an extended version
of Fig. 7. Note that there is less variability between explanations/attributions for LLM (non-private)
than there is for integrated gradients.
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C.3 Private LLM Filters
Input  = 2,D′ = 300  = 2, no RF  = 5.2, no RF
Figure 10: Highest activated filters for 5 test inputs under 3 differentially private setups, the leftmost
filter having highest activation. We compare the default setting with random filters with D′ = 300
(left), the same setting without random filters, but still  = 2, which incurs a loss in test accuracy but
yields clearer filters (center), and a lower privacy setting trained with σ = 1.0 for 60 epochs, which
amounts to  = 5.2 (right). As the level of noise is reduced, more interpretable filters are retrieved.
When optimizing for accuracy in the high privacy case, however, we see that model interpretability
suffers significantly.
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